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Abstract: This article asks how variations of state territorial control have influenced police missions in
the recent past, and illustrate how recent police reforms were based on the structure of a ‘western’ type
state with clearly identifiable formal state institutions enjoying autonomy, that strive for a form of territorial
monopoly over violence. The article argues for moving beyond such assumptions by adopting scenarios
based on how territory is controlled, developing four scenarios that can enable foreign-backed police
missions to adapt to local circumstances. The article draws upon the typology of territorial control developed
by Hansen in 2017/2019, amending this model to be adapted for policing. It argues that each of these
scenarios require different strategies and compromises in order to create functioning police forces.
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1. Introduction
International guidelines for policing tend to put focus upon
the state. This generally entails reconstructing institutions
based on a perceived ‘western’ type state with clearly identi-
fiable formal autonomy, that strives for a form of monopoly
over violence, often taking the viability of such structures for
granted [1,2]. However, many police missions face a con-
fusing situation where existing state institutions take other
forms and interact with other social structures. These social
structures include clans, tribes, criminal groups, and armed
insurgents involved in governance. In many cases, complex
local context has hampered police missions, and the success
rates of international missions are troublesome [3–14].
We should not expect the result of police institution build-
ing to mirror the state-controlled model prevalent amongst
donors, as this also influences the tasks that become impor-
tant for policing; after all, the key should be the quality of the
police services provided given the resources available, rather
than the structure of the institutions providing those services.
This article argues that a tool from the risk management
sector known as scenario planning, can be used to avoid
several of these problems. Chris Ruggeri, national managing
principal of Deloitte Risk and Financial Advisory, argues that
“scenario planning helps the organization embrace uncer-
tainty by developing data-driven stories about the future that
can generate more informed decisions” [15]. Scenarios are
here prepared for deployment under different types of circum-
stances, in the case of police operations, related to variations
over the type of state control in question. Subsequently, such
scenarios can help to systematize our understanding of situ-
ations where state institutions lack importance, and where
personal networks are more important.
This article will ask how variations in state territorial
control influenced police missions in the past, and then
develop four scenarios that can enable foreign-backed po-
lice missions to adopt to such circumstances. It will first
observe the experiences of police missions after the start
of the war on terror in 2001, then discuss the problems they
have faced, and finally construct four general scenarios
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and their policy implications. In order to do this, the article
draws upon Hansen’s 2017/2019 work on the relationship
between jihadist organizations and territorial control, chang-
ing and adapting it to policing [16,17]. It does this to build
upon Hansen’s typology to offer scenarios as a basis for
developing policy interventions.
2. Police Missions in the Age of the ‘War on Terror’
Since 2001, efforts to create or build police institutions have
encountered large problems. In Afghanistan, the first plans
to (re)create a police force emerged after the G8 Meeting in
Geneva in 2002, through a plan for security sector reform
(SSR). It established a state monopoly of violence, and a
more state-centric approach to Afghan policing where the
police forces were to be centrally controlled [18]. This model
was abandoned, as foreign donors understood that the
model was ill-suited to the conflict system of Afghanistan,
where traditional tribal institutions and armed groups had
traditions for implementing justice even before the Afghan
Civil War. This model was based on specific assumptions,
one of which according to Paris (2004) is that the state has
to monopolize coercive power before enforcing the rule of
law [19]. Lawrence (2012) presents the challenges of a
state-centric approach to security sector reform in fragile
and post conflict areas, stating that the resources available
to establish new institutions and sustain them are often not
available, as they are higher than the host state’s revenue
and the donor’s will to support them [20]. In many cases,
newly established institutions ended up lacking legitimacy,
as the local populations simply continued to rely upon other
justice providers from the past civil war. In Afghanistan, the
prewar state had always delegated justice and law func-
tions to non-state actors in the countryside [21]. Donors
were also unprepared for several of the other conditions
that they encountered - for example, the first attempts to
create police forces involved the re-deployment of individ-
ual policemen to villages without oversight, monitoring, or
assistance mechanisms [22]. There was a grey zone be-
tween policing, counter-insurgency, and institution building,
and institutions were not always designed for the relevant
situation. At times, police forces became synonymous with
forces doing counterinsurgency and were too lightly armed
and too numerically weak at a local level to survive the pres-
sure from non-state armed groups; at other times, police
forces were hijacked by local power-holders [23].
Interestingly, the conditions in Afghanistan had parallels
with situations in other countries. In Somalia, policing was
seen as a key element in building the new Somali state, and
the approach was state-centric from the start [24]. More-
over, Somalia saw tension resulting from police forces ex-
panding into regions with a presence of jihadist groups. Due
to police acting as support troops for African Union offen-
sives, the border between being police and being a soldier
was unclear [25]. In Southern Somalia, a problem occurred
when the Somali government and the UNDP planned to
create rural police forces; they were found to be too lightly
armed to be able to survive [24]. The police force also had
to navigate a society where it faced rival social structures,
organizations which implemented justice functions (often
better than the police), and areas with tensions and distrust
between regional states and the federal state [9,26].
In Mali, the EU civilian mission in Mali (EUCAP MALI),
was launched in January 2015 with a two-year mandate
tasked with improving the operational efficiency of the na-
tional police [27]. The police mission was skeptical of ex-
panding into the northern countryside because the area
was seen as too insecure for policing [28].
In Iraq, the police were originally trained for a community-
policing role with light side arms and light vehicles, but
the general lack of security led to them facing insurgents,
and suffering heavy losses from 2004-2006 [26]. Subse-
quently, heavier police commando units were created after
the model of American SWAT forces with more emphasis
on combat operations, but these failed in achieving trust
from the community [28–31].
The common denominator of all of these experiences
was summed up by David Bayley and Pobert Perito; “in
mission after mission ... training programs have been put
in place like canned food that is assumed to be universally
nourishing. In complex environments, however, one size
doesn’t fit all” [32].
State centralism, paired with an underlying assumption
that the state had a monopoly of coercive power, often char-
acterized the initial stages of security sector reform. Police
reformers were unprepared for the fact that they faced alter-
native, and often rivaling justice providers. Scholars such
as Ebo (2007), Baker (2010), Sky (2006), Andersen (2011)
underlined the errors of such assumptions, stressing the
need for working with state traditions and local conditions,
suggesting a hybrid approach, rather than a state-centric
approach [33–36]. Donais (2017) stressed that non-state
justice providers, although fluctuating in power, had proven
to be more stable than often perceived, making it harder
to challenge or circumvent them. Despite increased cri-
tique from theorists, the implementation of security sector
reform generally remained state-centric [37]. Moreover,
even critics ignored important types of cases facing policy
reformers in the field, such as what to do with non-state
governed enclaves who were doing policing, as was the
case in Somaliland in the Horn of Africa.
When more hybrid models were deployed they also
faced problems, frequently experiencing capture by local
strongmen or criminal groups that were in control of central
state institutions; implementing transparency and the rule
of law also remained a problem.
The academic discussion thus had several gaps: the
state as an endpoint was kept as an assumption, the prac-
tical programs failed to explore state capture by criminal
groups, and there was a failure to assess the impact of local
strongmen. The question of what the state controlled, and if
criminal groups could capture state institutions were central
in understanding the above failures, and in understanding
the state’s presence in the territories they de-jure should
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control, as well as the presence of other groups within state
institutions.
3. Introducing Territorial Presence
As reported by Matthew Schwartz, newly created or
adapted police forces in many places face other networks
that perform de-facto policing, such as clans, family net-
works and tribes [38]. Denny, for example, sees community
police structures as varying according to state involvement,
at times taking advantage of non-state actors, and at times
operating in areas where the state is weak [39]. In some set-
tings, a central state leadership may even accept police-like
governance structures from various agents, tribes, militias,
private military corporations and even criminal networks
[40]. Supporters and facilitators of security sector and po-
lice reform still tend to expect a typical configuration of a
state, often reassembling the structures found in states such
as the United States, France, and China. It is often forgotten
that these type of states and state institutions are a rather
new invention; China, for example, has large problems with
disciplining and controlling its own institutions as recently
as the 1980s, and has had unclear borders between police
actors and criminal cartels [10,41]. Re-establishing police
services in post-conflict situations means that one must
deal with a state that at times does not follows the standard
expectation of what a state is today. In some states, the
elite establishes a neo-patrimonial system to stay in power,
not necessarily to create state institutions, but to further
their own interests, with little care for the general population
[40,42,43]. The borders between state and criminal groups
might be unclear and blurred, and in some cases, criminal
groups might even be a part of this system of governance
[44–47].
At times, the state might retract itself completely from
parts of a country. This can be a way of saving money
for increasing the profit for a ruling elite, for restricted re-
sources, saving lives, or gaining political support, or could
be a result of casualty sensitivity. It should not be forgotten
that the West also employs similar strategies; in Iraq, the
withdrawal of the Occupational Forces into fortified and rel-
atively isolated camps was a product of American strategy
in the period from 2003-2006 [48,49].
Even if the state is rich, its peripheral areas can also
be very poorly controlled because of geographical features
that can make policing costly. For example, a rich country
like Norway is unable to properly investigate illegal fishing
around its Bovet Island in the South Atlantic, despite the
belief amongst experts that this type of crime is extensive
in the area [50]. Norway has simply chosen to retract from
the area, save infrequent visits (less than once every two
years) by its Navy. In the Malian case, the Mali-Algerian
border has few people living in the border areas, generating
little income [51,52].
The income required to provide more control is at times
unobtainable, or too large for a state to prioritize. Territorial
control might thus vary, and the way that the state retracts
its borders with the society around it might be unclear, with
parallel channels of governance outside the formal state
institutions. In essence, the state could have a limited pres-
ence amongst its civilian population, despite being militarily
strong.
How can one systematize thinking around what kind of
presence the government wields in new areas where police
forces are to be created? A suitable model has to consider
the practical effects of government withdrawal, if this is the
case. Such withdrawal can be voluntary, even to the extent
that a central government or an occupying force has control
if it chooses to and cannot be beaten in open battles, but
still chooses to restrict its presence. In some cases, the
government might even face an enclave with an ‘anti-state’
and an organization that protests the government’s right to
rule, that has established control and produces governance
[53–59]. A good model also has to take into consideration
that the government might delegate responsibility to crimi-
nal groups to handle issues of governance, or be integrated
into the elite at the top of the state.
Hansen (2017;2019) studies a form of violent actors,
violent jihadist organizations and religiously inspired orga-
nizations using violence to achieve their targets [16,17].
While these actors are different from internationally recog-
nized states, Hansen’s model focuses on the relationship
between these organizations and territorial control. He
argues that these organizations might be accommodated
by a state, might exist secretly in areas which the state
control, or might be left with vital governance functions in
areas where the state neglects the provision of human se-
curity to its locals or has full territorial control. This model
avoids seeing territory and territorial control as being static,
and rather acknowledges it as produced and reproduced,
through the very practices of the state and other actors that
are discussed in this article. In this view, it is a product
of practices existing a priory, yet it also leads to certain
conditions and practices that are of relevance to policing.
This model acknowledges the concept of territoriality might
change and is influenced by the interaction of the relevant
actors, yet it also acknowledges that a specific type of terri-
toriality entails a specific set of practices. Following Stuart
Elden, territoriality and territory can be understood as be-
ing techniques for measuring land and controlling terrain, it
becomes a political technology [60].
Hansen’s model seems suited to explore transforma-
tions of insurgency groups rather than sketching up sce-
narios for policing, yet it holds some important insights that
can be developed further. Ultimately, the level of security
a regime can implement in territories under its theoretical
jurisdiction influences territorial control. This control is also
influenced by the government’s use of non-government
agents in their attempts to do governance, and the type of
agents they use. These factors might similarly influence
policing, changing the context of the police operation from
a good security situation, where the police deal with familiar
institutions within a state structure, to a situation where the
government either is too weak or absent to provide secu-
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rity, and/or relies on non-state groups as agents performing
governance.
Hansen bases his model on four scenarios, sketching
out variations over the relationship between the violent ji-
hadist organization and the territory in which it operates.
In the first scenario, the state allows such an organiza-
tion to operate and, in many cases, uses it for governance
purposes. Al Qaeda, for example, served as trainers for mil-
itant groups supported by Sudan during their Sudan years
[17]. In one sense, this scenario mirrors another in which
a new police force faces criminal forces integrated with the
state it is supposed to serve. In order to draw out the im-
plications for policing, the focus in the scenario has to be
slightly modified to a scenario where non-state (and some-
times criminal) actors are performing governance functions.
The government in question will employ non-state armed
groups; government willingness to cooperate with such
groups means that the border between state institutions
and non-state institutions has become blurred. In some
such cases, crime has been integrated into the govern-
ment structure and government leaders might be directly
involved in crime. Its acceptance by the elite makes polic-
ing extremely difficult, not unlike in the state of Chicago in
the 1930s [61]. In Kenya, in 2007, several youth gangs,
including the infamous Mungiki and also the less known
Taliban youth gang (not to be confused with the Taliban
of Afghanistan), were used by politicians in the struggle
leading up to the elections [62]. In his classic book on
Warlordism, William Reno sketches out how patrimonialism
networks branched into criminal networks in West Africa
in the 1990s [63]. He also describes how informal net-
works outside the state are more important for many state
leaders than the formal institutions of the state; in these
cases, crime might be imbedded with the state itself. In
order to adapt the scenario here, we might refer to it as the
crime/state governance assemblage scenario.
A second model, referred to as the ‘state control’ sce-
nario, focuses on the situation faced by policing in Europe,
North America, Oceania and East Asia, where the state
controls violence through its security institutions, including
police structures. In these cases, violent jihadists exist as
clandestine networks, are afraid of being investigated, and
are focused on organizational security. State institutions
dominate the provision of law and order, making this is the
ideal type of the ‘modern state’, and the goal that many po-
lice reforms and many new police forces attempt to achieve
[40]. Importantly, it often seems to be an end target for
attempts to construct and re-construct new police forces;
the problem is that there are large parts of the world where
the ‘state control’ scenario has never been applied histori-
cally, with some areas being hampered by geography, lack
of income, and relatively strong alternatives.
Hansen introduces a third scenario, ‘semi-territoriality’,
where a state has yielded control by retracting itself; the
state, or an international occupying force, focuses on se-
curity concerns for its troops by sheltering them in bases,
and apart from the odd government campaign, has little
(if any) presence at the local level. A Yemeni friend of the
writer perfectly described this scenario, commenting on
pre-war Yemen, claiming, “Yemen is a post office in Sanaa
[Yemen’s capital] where I get my passport when I travel
abroad, otherwise I don’t see ‘Yemen’ anywhere [64]. In
the original scenario, violent jihadist organizations were
allowed advantages, as locals had to relate to them; the
violent jihadists would come back when the government
pulled back their forces after intermittent campaigns. These
campaigns would function like a child squeezing a balloon
without ripping it: if you squeeze the insurgents one place,
they will flow into another sparsely controlled area, then
come back when the government had left. This meant that
locals had to adjust to the violent insurgency groups; simi-
larly, a state of semi-territoriality means that locals have to
adjust to living with other armed groups than the ones loyal
to the state. In such cases, security and justice provision
are at times dependent on armed groups in opposition to
the state.
Such a situation leads to forms of hedging techniques on
behalf of the locals, where actors with semi-territorial power
have to be accommodated if locals want to stay safe. There
are many strategies to achieve this: locals might integrate
into groups, try to get their sons or daughters to partici-
pate in group activities, or even seek to gain leadership
positions. Supplying recruits for armed militias, supplying
brides in marriage or paying protection money (tax) might
be additional approaches. Local support for state institu-
tions is weakly manifested in these cases, where the state
does not have a strong enough presence to protect the
loyalists, leaving them at the mercy of hostile armed groups.
This happened in Iraq during the first part of the insur-
gency, where tribal allies of the occupation forces were left
to themselves [48]. The Somali examples illustrate a similar
situation, where clans had to interact and even integrate
into the Shabaab in order to survive, and there was little
support from the government or the forces of the African
Union [65]. The paradox is that these areas are under the
military control of the state, and the opposing armed groups
do not have the means to defeat the state in open battle, yet
the state has retracted from providing day-to-day security.
Returning to Hansen’s ideal types, a last scenario de-
scribes a case where an insurgency organization is setting
up institutions of governance in an area that is under their
relatively permanent territorial control. In such a scenario,
an organization hostile to the state will perform governance,
often including police services. For the purpose of this arti-
cle, one might expand it from a violent jihadist organization,
to including any type of insurgency/cessation organization
controlling territory on a more permanent basis, an exam-
ple being Somaliland in Somalia, or even Ossetia or the
trans-Dniester republic in Moldova [66,67]. Rebel-created
governance structures in enclaves can be relatively perma-
nent, and can bring forms of stability as well as policing to
a local population. This is not always the case, and might
depend on historical conditions, traditions and the stability
of rebel control [68]. In this case, it would be the rebels that
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do govern the local population, even when they have limited
governance institutions, predictability and stability depend
on them.
We now have four ideal types based on Hansen
(2017/2019), which have been slightly altered for the study
of police operations and will be outlined. Under certain
circumstances, newly created police forces will face a
state/crime assemblage scenario, where crime and state
will be intertwined, and where criminal groups have been
used for governance purposes. However, under other con-
ditions, a newly created police force might face a state
where parallel state institutions are managing to uphold a
monopoly of violence; this is reminiscent of the typical situ-
ation in North America, North Asia and Europe, which can
be called a ‘state controlled’ scenario, where state insti-
tutions have the power to define police reform structures
due to their position in the international aid and security
landscape. In a third and very different scenario known
as the semi-territorial scenario, the state has withdrawn
from the day to day dealings in a region, although entering
into it in on an irregular basis and wielding superior forces
when doing so. The final scenario named the enclave sce-
nario, is where the state has fully given up control over
an area lacks reach, and is in many ways irrelevant, as
an alternative structure is performing governance. For the
purpose of this article, such a scenario might be named the
enclave scenario. In the original model, Hansen stresses
that several of these four scenarios can co-exist within a
state: for instance, in some cases, a part of the de jure
state can have a state-controlled scenario in the capital city,
but have an enclave inside its de-jure territories, as well as
lacking a permanent presence in other areas, while working
in league with governance networks in other regions.
As will be shown, these scenarios demand different
structures in the development efficient solutions to policing.
The model can say something about the conditions in which
police operate under and its variations, and perhaps more
clearly underline the particular necessities for policing in
each case.
4. The State/Crime Assemblage Scenario
When doing research in Kenya for the EU-financed Hori-
zon 2020 policing project, one reoccurring criticism from
several interviews with the United Nations UNODC and
UNDP programs was that these programs were ‘policy blind’
[69]. The political strata was seen to be unwilling to dis-
card criminal practices and criminal connections, instead
leaving police reform as an exercise in fulfilling bureaucratic
checkpoints. The NGOs underlined that the ability to handle
crime becomes less important if one lacks the will, partly
due to the involvement of elites in criminal activities. In
one sense, the comments point to one of the essential
features of this scenario, namely the lack of will to handle
criminal networks despite having the resources to do so
[70]. Police reform quickly becomes merely an exercise
for organizations to attempt to follow a list of benchmarks
without understanding the situation; such material capacity
building doesn’t necessarily transform into better policing.
Attempts to use a standard set of strategies employed in
East Asia, Europe, North Asia, Oceania or North America,
might be counterproductive and even dangerous to policing,
as the institutions and structures vary considerably.
To venture into a state-to-state-bilateral support pro-
gram, or indeed a United Nations/regional organization to
state program, becomes a dangerous step where checks
and balances become essential. To read and understand
the local situation becomes essential, requiring a broad dia-
logue locally, as well as particular understanding of the links
between the police and the criminal networks, the networks
doing governance, which non-state networks that are im-
portant, and the interaction between formal institutions and
informal channels. In this scenario, information triangulation
becomes very important, and a proper mapping of the
informal institutions that are important for the gover-
nance, and the legality of these institutions according to
national and international law is essential. There are a
number of potential key allies in police reform: for example,
human rights groups could be act as a check on the police
forces, while state institutions that are ‘cleaner’ (even cadre
units within the police itself, isolated from the rest of the
police forces) can be expanded and supported. Religious
leaders with integrity could also be allies, as could journal-
ists. In such situations, it is important to remember that the
institutions with the ability to perform checks and balances
in relation to the police could be in danger of facing violence
from the police or allied gangs, although international pres-
sure and international exposure might give some protection
to such institutions. In order to achieve all of this, it is nec-
essary to have a permanent and robust presence on the
ground for international NGOs and other entities involved in
police reform. Such presence becomes important in obtain-
ing firsthand knowledge of the economic links and network
links between individuals within the police, the government,
various criminal groups, non-state commercial actors.
The State/crime assemblage must be understood and
the links and economic incentives sustaining them must be
disentangled. To do so enables actors involved in police
reform to block negative economic incentives, or to alter
them in support of a police force disentangled from crim-
inal groups and clientism. A paradox in this situation is
that a general increase in police payment might alleviate
some of the problems facing the police forces, as policemen
become less dependent on criminal activities for income
generation. If checks and balances fail to be implemented,
international engagement might actually aid the buildup of
criminal groups.
Last but not least, a scenario might entail political reform
or even political change - these situations have scared away
international donors in the past. Political change is sensi-
tive, can be seen as undue foreign interference in domestic
politics and can lead to sanctions from the local political
elite. Moreover, material support for the police forces can
disappear in corruption or end with criminal groups [71].
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While this scenario is challenging, an approach that in-
cludes focus on political reform and checks and balances
on the police forces, with emphasis on understanding lo-
cal conditions, might enhance the probabilities for success.
Most importantly, international police reformers must un-
derstand that countermeasures may be necessary in such
an environment, and be willing to implement countermea-
sures, even when it means challenges from local political
elites. Strengthening policing includes pressure for politi-
cal change and making important decisions over whether
parallel governance systems should be included in efficient
policing or be dismantled or detached from governance.
5. The State-Controlled Scenario
A more common approach focusing on the state as the se-
curity provider, as it was conducted in Bosnia, might serve
well in such a scenario [72]. There will be pitfalls as local
authoritarian traditions can create human rights violations,
as well as a lack of contact between the police and the
local communities. However, many of the experiences of
common donors will be highly relevant, as the scenario
reassembles police reform work in Europe, North-East Asia,
Oceania and North America, where most donors came from.
This is closer to the one-size fits all approach that several
governments have promoted in the past. Experiences from
donor countries and their recent attempts on police reform
can be employed [73]. Checks and balances do matter, as
do efforts to improve transparency inside the police forces’
attempts to improve community interaction.
Although this type of scenario is common in the West,
western examples demonstrate its shortcomings. For exam-
ple, trust between police and communities becomes very
important, to ensure proper communication and that com-
munities in general feel protected; local understanding is
very important in this sense [74–76]. In the past, the lack of
such communication, in many cases created by the lack of
trust, and the absence of a map of large-scale connections
and overlaps between the police and crime groups have
hampered police work in Europe and United States [77–80].
Top-down reforms become easier to implement due to hi-
erarchy, while centralized police reform becomes easier to
implement as it centralizes the monopoly of violence.
6. The Semi-Territorial Scenario
In parts of Somalia such as the rural areas in the Bay-
Bakool area or central Mudug, or in southern Algeria, it
is difficult to spot any state institutions. The state, police
forces included, is absent, save the odd military campaign
or patrols; for locals, the police either do not exist or exist
on an ad hoc basis. The state has a solid presence in many
of these areas in the form of strong military units that are
superior to insurgency forces, but do not engage in policing
and providing local security at a regular basis.
Local power holders as insurgents become important
providers of security, either by attempting to create some
form of security services for locals, or through becoming
the producers of insecurity that locals have to envisage
strategies in order to appease. As previously mentioned,
such strategies can include appeasement through providing
recruits, tax, or wives to insurgent outfits, which allow lo-
cals to embed themselves into insurgent groups and avoid
sanctions through the creation of networks and connections.
Forced recruitment and marriage might also take place.
In some cases, other more informal governance entities,
such as clans or tribes, might provide some police/security
functions and their own justice mechanisms. However, sev-
eral of these mechanisms might have serious drawbacks
when it comes to gender issues and human rights. This
means that any police reform will face a set of challenges,
the first and foremost being the lack of will and capacity to
establish the state, including the police in these areas. In
some cases, it might not be cost-effective for the state to
deploy in the areas. In other cases, it might be costly in the
short term, but cost-effective in the long term - for example,
by denying guerilla movements on the ground so the state
will need convincing before deploying resources. When the
state builds up a presence, it cannot be done piecemeal, as
insurgents and local power holders would have the power to
fight off small police forces. In Somalia, for example, a plan
for three to five person police forces in the countryside had
to be abandoned because of fears that Shabaab units would
crush the Somali police. In Iraq, lightly armed community
police units faced the same problem [13,24]. Police forces
in the initial stage must be equipped to defend themselves
from heavy attacks (which hampers their investigative ef-
forts), and have to look more like heavy armed militias in
order to survive.
Community contacts become important, as do the pro-
vision of police services to the locals. Local communities
will most likely face severe deprecations if seen supporting
new police forces before a secure environment is created,
and thus hostility from the local communities, with severe
reprisals against ethnic groups supporting the police be-
comes likely. Steps to protect local allies must be enhanced,
and possible military units might be involved in creating a
security environment more conducive to normal policing.
Standardized police programs based on experiences and
techniques from Europe, North Asia, North America and
Oceania are less suited for this type of police reform, and
counterinsurgency techniques focusing on protecting lo-
cal populations and security forces must be given priority.
Police units, also community police, have to be heavily
coordinated with other security forces in order to receive
quick reinforcements if needed, and have to have heavy
armaments.
Local allies, if supported and provided with ample se-
curity, can be valuable in upholding justice. Local clan
mechanisms, for example, can be used to relieve the po-
lice of duties and to act as force multipliers. In the case of
lack of state capacity or local legitimacy, such use of local
clan mechanisms or community policing programs might
become the only viable option in justice provision in the fore-
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seeable future, and might have been so in the past. They
might be the nucleus of a new policing regime that does not
reassemble any Westphalian type of state and yet be the
only realistic alternative. However, this solution has many
drawbacks: for example, human rights shortcomings, in the
form of discrimination against females or ethnic minorities,
are in many ways entrenched in traditional governance sys-
tems as clans or tribal entities. Such problems have been
addressed by dialogue in the past, and local structures
can be flexible and possibly influenced through interaction
with outsiders [81]. Also, local allies often need to defend
themselves and their institutions against insurgents and
criminal groups; if this is not forthcoming, these allies might
disappear when outside support is still needed.
In such areas, efforts to create a secure environment
conducive to policing should be prioritized over normal po-
lice duties. The scenario is simply not fit for ‘ordinary’ police
forces, something that must be considered when design-
ing police forces for cases reassembling the traits of this
scenario. In such zones, law and order and the sense of
ordinary justice for the local population is essential. Violent
organizations such as the Shabaab, the Lord’s Resistance
Army and the Allied Democratic Forces have used such
zones for survival and have staged large attacks out of
them [16,17].
7. The Enclave Scenario
The enclave scenario also brings large dilemmas to police
reform, some of which are political. For instance, as when
the Islamic State governed parts of Iraq and Syria, the local
power holder might provide forms of justice and police ser-
vices, but will transgress human rights and have aggressive
goals [57–59]. In such cases, an engagement in building up
police forces or reforming police will be seriously hampered
by hostility from potential donors. Moreover, the survival
of the enclave could be in doubt. Local actors that are not
accepted by a majority of international states can neverthe-
less adroitly provide police services to the local population,
which could present a major dilemma is if such enclaves
also should be a possible nucleus for creating local police
forces. This presents a political question: is it state-building
or the provision of police services that should be the pri-
ority? After all, an enclave might have a better system for
provision of police services than the state it nominally is
a part of. Supporting enclave policing based on the rebel
faction in control might be the best way to provide services
locally, but could counter-act state-building processes, and
creating the appearance of taking sides in a civil war situa-
tion. This creates its own issues – often, the rebel ruler will
also be unacceptable to the international community.
This is similar to the problems between Somalia and
the self-declared state of Somaliland, where the latter, al-
though not internationally recognized, produces more ex-
tensive and better services (including policing). The Soma-
liland/Somalia situation has been largely solved by seeking
the approval of the government of Somalia for projects im-
plemented in Somaliland, and by standardizing equipment
and education in projects targeting both the enclave, and
forces outside of the enclave. In other instances, such
as the Kurdish self-governed areas or in the case of pre-
independence Kosovo, the West chose to back police re-
form: in the first case as a part of a more federal arrange-
ment, but also as an acceptance that the lack of trust in Iraq
made national policing in the Kurdish areas impossible. A
secondary question arises in whether an enclave could be
a part of a state-building effort? The power dynamics within
international relations are a central force within this ques-
tion, especially the consideration of which powers support
the enclave and which powers support the state’s leader-
ship. International politics will thus limit the possibilities for
international engagement. However, it should be noted that
engagement with enclaves might be highly useful - in the
case of pre-independence Kosovo, the West chose to back
police reform, in the first case as a part of a more federal
arrangement, but also as an acceptance that the lack of
trust. In Iraq, this strategy made national policing in the
Kurdish areas impossible. In the second case, the purpose
was to build up a new state. In Somalia, one also chose to
engage Somaliland, despite the second entity lacking back-
ing for independence [24]. The Federal system in Somalia
was to a certain extent based on enclave thinking, as the
central government lacked the necessary trust to do large-
scale policing in regional entities such as the Juba State
and Puntland. The solution was found in creating both local
police handled by the enclave, as well as a federal police
structure handling border patrols and investigations in the
capital, all while including weak mechanisms of centraliza-
tion in the process. These mechanisms included common
training sessions, common uniforms, etc [13,24].
When dealing with an enclave that is not aggressive
and avoids substantial human rights violations, the ques-
tion also turns political. Should human security and the
service provision given to locals count more than vague
dreams of future centralization and central state building?
Can federalization be a tool to make police reform accept-
able to international actors? Will police reform inside the
enclave really undermine state building, when the central
state lacks presence in the enclave anyway? Can the So-
malia/Somaliland solution be a model in other cases? If
the political issues are overcome, the police reform efforts
might be efficient. Moreover, as illustrated in the above
discussions, there are thus possible mechanisms that can
promote the integration of the police forces from the enclave
into a larger police force.
8. Conclusions
It is easy to develop general practices for police reform
which are seen as globally valid. However, research liter-
ature rightly suggests that local conditions must be taken
into consideration when designing a police reform program.
Additionally, reform must be open for a variety of intentions
from the local elite, and it must be able to handle the level of
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violence taking place locally. Today, police forces in peace-
keeping missions are required to undergo considerable
training before they go into deployment, and UN organiza-
tions have developed common training programs [82], such
as the Standardized Generic Training Modules (SGTMs),
the Core Pre-deployment Training Materials (CPTM) and
the Specialized Training Materials (STMs). Although these
programs are designed for peacekeeping and not for po-
lice reform (and therefore have an operational focus), they
illustrate a lack of local adaptation.
A typology as presented here can help police experts
go beyond these standardized curriculums to understand
that variations in context should influence the structure of a
police reform or of new institutions. Additionally, the typol-
ogy will enable individuals in the field to think systematically
about variables that influence structure and training. The
ideal type of scenarios will hopefully also serve as a point
of departure for future discussions that might refine them.
These scenarios serve as a useful reminder that police
reform is influenced by both global and local politics, and
that politics often must to be addressed in order to achieve
successful results (yet actors such as the UN often shun
away from this). It also highlights the uncomfortable fact
that the local provision of basic human security and polic-
ing at times can be thwarted by or sacrificed for a larger
state-building agenda, even where a centralized state might
not have existed in the past. These scenarios remind us
of the importance of taking the locals seriously, and seeing
possibilities as well as challenges in local dynamics. To
study variations over the territorial control variable might
help in better understanding the local challenges faced by
the police in many countries in the world, and to understand
how these challenges can be met.
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